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Increasing access charges and transactions costs arising from monopoly rights in data 
and information adversely affect the conduct of science, especially exploratory 
research programs. The latter are critical for the sustained growth of knowledge-driven 
economies, and are most efficiently pursued in the “open science” mode. In some 
fields, informal cooperative norms for timely sharing of access to raw data-steams and 
documented database resources are being undermined by legal institutional innovations 
that accommodate the further privatizing of the public domain in information. A 
variety of corrective measures are needed to restore proper balance to the IPR regime. 
(JEL: H 4, K 39, O 31, O 34 ) 
 
 
1   Will Better Fences Make Better Neighbors in Science and Technology Research? 
 
The American poet Robert Frost’s ode to individualism celebrates the stone fences 
that distinguish the rural landscape of upland New England: “good fences make good 
neighbors.” Perhaps it is so, where the resource involved is land, onto which the 
livestock from neighboring farms otherwise may wander to graze and thereby destroy 
the provender of the animals already pastured there. But is it so, too, when one 
scientist pores over the data gathered by another, examines the soundness of the 
deductive chain of inference leading to a new theory, or tests the efficacy of a 
proposed method of chemical synthesis? Simple consideration of the “public goods” 
nature of ideas, data and information tells us that such is not the case; that they are 
not at all like forage, depleted and degraded by use in consumption and production.  
  “Public goods” is a term of art in modern economics. It does not refer to the 
provenance of goods and services, that is to say, with whether they are produced by 
public agencies or in the private sector of the economy. Rather, this term denotes the 
class of goods possessing a particular set of properties that distinguish them from   - 2 -
ordinary commodities – namely,  substantial  indivisibility or lumpiness, limitless 
replicability at negligibly low incremental cost, invariant availability for concurrent 
and repetitive use – sometimes described as the property of infinite expansibility, or 
non-rivalness of use. The meaning and significance of these peculiar properties will 
be considered more fully in the course of the following discussion. For the moment, 
however, it should suffice to insist that ideas and data-sets are not at all like pastures 
subject to being “over-grazed.” 
Instead, they are likely to be enriched and rendered more accurate, more explicitly 
codified and more thoroughly documented and annotated the more that researchers 
are allowed to comb through them. It is by means of wide and complete disclosure, 
and the skeptical efforts to replicate novel research findings, that scientific research 
communities collectively build bodies of “reliable knowledge.” Thus, there are sound 
reasons in modern economic analysis for hesitating to embrace “private property 
rights” as a universal panacea which should be applied evermore vigorously and 
extensively throughout the domain of intellectual and cultural production. This is not 
to claim that there is no place whatsoever for statutory measures that extend legal 
protection to the rights of creators of “intellectual property.”  
The system of resource allocation through competitive markets grounded upon the 
legal protections afforded to private property has been found to work well in the 
domain of conventional commodities that are exhausted in the process of use and 
cannot be simultaneously enjoyed by many. Some of the same beneficial effects 
observed in that context, undoubtedly, can extend also into the sphere of intellectual 
production and distribution. But as particularly perverse economic consequences are 
entailed by the establishment and modification of existing institutional arrangements 
to effect that extension within the realm of knowledge, information and scientific 
data, there is an evident need for public policy to be attentive to maintaining a healthy 
balance between the prospective gains and losses. 
Unfortunately, the past two decades have seen the development of just the 
opposite trend. Most significantly, in my view, the current overly literal application 
of the metaphor of “property”, which accords exclusive emphasis to the desirability 
of socially enforced rights to exclude trespassers and to alienate “commodities” on 
terms set in contexts of voluntary exchange, has resulted in institutional innovations 
that have a potential to do serious damage in the field of scientific and technological 
research, with all the adverse implications that this may carry for the long-term 
course of innovation and economic welfare growth in the advanced, “knowledge-
driven” economies and the developing economies alike. By its very nature, the 
alternative to proprietary research the pursuit of “open science” requires patronage 
from external sources of grant and contract funding, or from those who are personally 
engaged, and often from both. 
Given the budgetary restraints placed upon the use of tax revenues to support the 
system of devolved patronage of academic-style, “open science” research carried on 
in universities and other public sector research establishments (PSREs), it has been is 
tempting to urge the researchers themselves to embrace proprietary research as the   - 3 -
solution to the income constraints under which they presently labor. This course of 
“self-help” in meeting the rising costs of modern scientific research demonstrably has 
proved attractive to the administrators of many comparatively well-endowed private 
universities, as well as public institutes in the industrially advanced societies. Yet, in 
the US, where the latter developments are well advanced and have offered a model 
that has attracted mimetic policy-makers in the UK and the EU, these have yielded 
only a small margin of incremental research support, averaging 8-10 per cent among 
the research universities. Furthermore, in a few specific research fields, and 
particularly in the life sciences (biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices), where the share of funding from industrial sources approaches 25 per cent at 
the leading institutions, the commercialization movement is perceptibly encroaching 
upon the culture of academic research and challenging the ethos of collaborative, 
open science. 
If there are only rather modest revenue benefits to be gained by PSREs and their 
researchers through the incentives effects that intellectual property rights protections 
create for devoting greater attention to commercially-oriented R&D, the same cannot 
be said about the potential costs. We must worry that further and sustained policies of 
applying the same “remedy” for the current fiscal situation of the global open science 
system is likely to have profound and seriously adverse transformative effects. In the 
end it could result in the paradoxical rise of excessively duplicative research projects 
by scientists and engineers who find themselves effectively isolated from recent 
additions to the stock of codified knowledge by increasingly dense “patent thickets,” 
and by steeper “royalty stacking” in the licenses imposed collectively by owners of 
copyrights and database rights. Whether or not social relations among academic 
colleagues are radically altered by the new spirit of entrepreneurship and “intellectual 
capitalism,” it seems altogether too possible that the introduction of encryption 
technologies in digital rights management systems by their institutional hosts could 
effectively deprive them of electronic access to the flow of datastreams, working 
memoranda, pre-prints customarily transmitted through cooperative, reciprocal 
exchange with publicly supported colleagues and institutions elsewhere.  Indeed, 
under the terms of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US), and parallel proposals 
for the EU, severe legal sanctions could be enforced against researchers within (as 
well as outside) a university or public institute and equally within a corporate 
laboratory, were they to disable digital rights management apparatus in order to 
continue to engage in the tradition of cooperative exchanges of knowledge. 
Yes, the private property rights system offers a readily prescribed and potentially 
potent “cure” for the condition of impoverished open science.  Unfortunately, it is 
one in which the patients can be gravely damaged. And it is not only they who may 
be at risk. The statutory reinforcement of technological “self help” in the form of 
digital rights management systems, including increasingly aggressive electronic-
countermeasures against possessors of authorized digital content, carries a potential 
to undo the entire regime whereby public policy regulated the terms that owners of 
protected intellectual property could make it available to users. In other words, the   - 4 -
law of contract and of one-way, non-negotiable contacts (on the model of the “shrink-
wrap,” “click-wrap” and “browse-wrap” licensing schemes that are proliferating on 
the Internet) threatens to displace intellectual property law, along with intellectual 
property lawyers as we have know them.
1 Surely that consideration, if not a concern 
for the future of science, technological innovation and long-term social and economic 
welfare, should provide an impetus for legal scholars and others concerned with the 
evolution of intellectual property laws to join in the work of devising remedial 
measures that would counteract this perilous institutional drift. 
A very modest contribution to that challenging undertaking is offered in this essay. 
Starting from a review of the economic rationales that may be provided for legal 
protection of intellectual property rights, it examines the concatenation of forces that 
have been driving the privatizing of the public domain in data and information, and 
the recent direction taken by the evolution of the IPR regime. Focusing upon statutory 
changes affecting the protections available to owners of copyright in the U.S., and of 
database rights in the European Union, the analysis points to potentially serious 
adverse consequences for research in science and technology. Quite clearly, these 
have not been accorded adequate weight by the proponents of those “institutional 
adaptations” to the new environment that has been formed by the advance of digital 
information technologies.  This analysis has a purpose beyond that of highlighting 
problematic developments that are emblematic of the more general contemporary 
trend towards broadening and strengthening the regime of IPR protections. It points 
to a variety of practical measures that may be used to construct countervailing 
protections for the pursuit of knowledge through “open science.” 
  
 
2    The Simple Economics of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Even when considered in isolation from its possible implications for long-term 
economic growth, the nature and consequences of recent trends that are altering the 
world’s intellectual property rights regimes is a topic that is attracting great interest 
and no little disagreement. In some respects this merely continues the long history of 
antiphony in economics. One set of voices, still carrying the theme enunciated by 
John Locke and Adam Smith, celebrates the protection of intellectual property along 
with private property of all forms as essential for motivating the formation and 
application of productive resources; whereas, contrapuntal voices deliver variations 
on Adam Smith’s jeremiads against the harms that are certain to befall the ultimate 
consumers of a good or service whenever an unregulated monopoly is allowed to 
persist in the chain of production and distribution.  
For many economists today the trouble is that they hear both of these voices 
clearly inside their own heads. Thus, against the contention that intellectual property 
monopolies raise prices above unit production costs, and thereby curtail the benefits 
                                                 
1 On this prospect, see the contribution by RADIN [2003] in this issue.   - 5 -
that consumers derive from the use of “protected” innovations, it is argued that the 
rights accorded under national statutes and international conventions on patents and 
copyrights (and, in some jurisdictions, databases) provide a significant inducement 
both directly and indirectly encouraging the formation of new “knowledge-assets” 
through investment in R&D. How strong such effects are in different branches of 
industry and product markets, gauged either in absolute terms or in relationship to 
other R&D investment incentives (such as investment tax credits, or vigorous 
enforcement of trade secrecy laws) remains a quite different, and much vexed 
empirical question. 
There is widespread agreement, nonetheless, on the significance of the fact that for 
many modern enterprises the performance of R&D, and the acquisition and 
management of R&D-performing entities, are now vital elements in competitive 
strategies of integrated innovation, production and marketing. For one side of the 
argument, this suggests that all means of augmenting incentives for R&D—IPR 
protection among them—will promote the growth, or at least the competitive survival 
of a nation’s industries. Yet, for the opposite side of the argument, what has to be 
recognized is that whether or not an R&D-intensive firm secures the profitability of 
its innovations by obtaining intellectual property rights, its own R&D will not go 
unaffected by the actions of other firms that are acquiring and exploiting patents and 
copyrights. When intellectual property owners exploit their rights in search of greater 
profits, the effect almost invariably raises the costs that other parties are obliged incur 
in order to access and utilize existing knowledge. This applies no less to the uses 
which such knowledge may have in generating new discoveries and inventions. 
Thus, the conclusion at which these analytical excursions arrive is indecisive: the 
existence of IPR protection provides a positive incentive for investing in the 
production of scientific and technological knowledge, and, at the same time adversely 
impacts either the efficiency of the R&D process, or the volume of such investment, 
or both. So, were you to ask the representative economist to pronounce upon the 
rightness or wrongness of intellectual property protections, you would get the same 
inconclusive conclusion that was offered more than four decades ago by a pioneer 
student of the economics of knowledge. In a submission to the Judiciary Committee 
of the U.S. Senate in 1958, the widely respected economist Fritz MACHLUP [1958, 
p.80] observed:  
 
“If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.  But since we have 
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it." 
 
Although economic analysis still has not been able to offer policy-makers a basis for 
choosing between "all or nothing" where intellectual property protection is 
concerned, as MACHLUP  [1958] rightly went on to observe, "it does provide a 
sufficiently firm basis for decisions about 'a little more or a little less' of various 
ingredients of the patent system." Indeed, in this more limited task quite substantial   - 6 -
progress has been made in recent years.
2 It is for these and related reasons that the 
effects of the changes which have been taking place at the national and international 
levels in IPR regimes not only deserves explicit notice in any serious discussion of 
“knowledge-driven” economic development, but also is a matter on which modern 
economics has something helpfully clear-cut to contribute. 
To properly grasp the key to the economics of intellectual property, one should 
start with the fact that knowledge is not like any other kind of good, and certainly 
does not resemble conventional commodities of the sort that are widely traded in 
markets.  Intellectual property cannot be placed on an equal footing with physical 
property, for the simple reason that knowledge and information possess a specific 
characteristic that economists refer to as “non-rival in use”: the same idea and its 
expression may be used repeatedly, and concurrently by many people, without being 
thereby “depleted.”  
This hardly is a modern insight, for the point was made almost two hundred years 
ago with precision and elegance in a letter penned to a Baltimore inventor by Thomas 
Jefferson in 1813: “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me.” For Jefferson, this was a consequence of nature having “peculiarly 
and benevolently” arranged that “ideas should freely spread from one to another over 
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man...when she designed them, like 
fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any point, and like 
the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation.”
3 
Modern economics identifies this property of information (infinite expansibility) 
as one of the two characteristics defining that special category of commodities known 
as “pure public goods,” the other being the costliness of excluding others from 
possession of an idea once it has been disclosed. More is at stake in the present 
context than a definition: the economic significance of the public goods nature of 
ideas and data is that the operation of competitive markets cannot be relied upon to 
yield price signals that lead to socially efficient outcomes with respect to the 
production and distribution of such commodities. From this condition flows the logic 
of public patronage for fundamental, exploratory research, the outcomes of which 
constitute vital informational “inputs” that guide and enhance the expected rate of 
economic returns from investment in commercial applications-oriented R&D. 
Adhering to the analytical economics perspective, that what is being protected by 
patents and copyrights is the exclusive right to the commercial exploitation of 
information, proves especially useful when one comes to consider the implications 
for scientific research activities of statutory obstacles to information access that have 
been created, and may yet be given force by the movement to strengthen and extend 
protection for intellectual property. 
                                                 
2 For reviews of the analytical literature in this vein, see, e.g. DAVID [1993]. 
3 D AVID [1993: pp. 35ff.] may be consulted for references, and further discussions of 
these passages in Jefferson’s writings.    - 7 -
The creation and assigning of intellectual property rights convey a monopoly right 
to the beneficial economic exploitation of an idea (in the case of patent rights) or of a 
particular expression of an idea (in the case of copyright) in return for the disclosure 
of the idea or its expression. This device allows the organisation of market exchanges 
of “exploitation rights,” which, by assigning pecuniary value to commercially 
exploitable ideas, creates economic incentives for people to go on creating new ones, 
as well as finding new applications for old ones. By allocating these rights to those 
who are prepared to pay the most for them, the workings of intellectual property 
markets also tend to prevent ideas from remaining in the exclusive (secret) possession 
of discoverers and inventors who might be quite uninterested in seeing their creations 
used to satisfy the wants and needs of other members of society. 
Thus a potential economic problem that is addressed by instituting a system of 
intellectual property rights is the threat that unfair competition, particularly the 
misappropriation of the benefits of someone else’s expenditure of effort, may destroy 
the provision of information-goods as a commercially viable activity. The nub of the 
problem here is that the cost of making a particular information good available to a 
second, third, or thousandth user are not significantly greater than those of making it 
available to the first one. Ever since the Gutenberg revolution, the technical advances 
that have lowered the costs of reproducing “encoded” material (text, images, sounds) 
also has permitted “pirates” to appropriate the contents of the first copy without 
bearing the expense of its development. Unchecked, this form of unfair competition 
could render unprofitable the investment entailed in obtaining that critical first copy.  
Producers of ideas, texts, and other creative works (including graphic images and 
music) are subject to economic constraints, even when they do not invariably respond 
to variation in the incentives offered by the market.  If they had no rights enabling 
them to derive income from the publication of their works, they might create less, and 
quite possibly be compelled to spend their time doing something entirely different but 
more lucrative. So, there is an important economic rationale for establishing 
intellectual property rights. 
To summarize, the “property” solution, which creates rights to the fruits of 
intellectual creations, possesses a number of definite virtues. These may be quickly 
adumbrated for the case of patents: 
(1)The patent provides an obvious and recognised solution to the economic 
problem of the intellectual creator. By increasing the expected private returns 
from innovation, it acts as an incentive mechanism to private investment in 
knowledge production.  
(2)Patents facilitate the market test of new invention because they allow 
disclosure of the related information while (in principle) protecting against 
imitation. 
(3)Patents create transferable rights (by granting a license, the “owner” of 
the knowledge allows it to be exploited by other agents) and, therefore, it can 
help to structure a complex transaction that also concerns unpatented 
knowledge.    - 8 -
(4)Patents are a means to signal and evaluate the future value of the 
technological effort of the companies that own them (which is particularly 
useful in the cases of new or young companies for which other classes of 
“intangibles” cannot be used for proper evaluation). 
 
This way of providing market incentives for certain kinds of creative effort leaves 
the valuation of the intellectual production to be determined ex post, by the 
willingness of users to pay; it thereby avoids having society try to place a value on 
the creative work ex ante – as would be required under alternative incentive schemes, 
such as offering prospective authors and inventors prizes, or awarding individual 
procurement contracts for specified works 
But, establishing a monopoly right to exploit that “first copy” (the idea protected 
by the patent or the expressive material protected by copyright), alas, turns out not to 
be a perfect one. The monopolist will raise the price of every copy above the 
negligible costs of its reproduction, and, as a result, there will be some potential users 
of the information good who will be excluded from enjoying it. The latter represents 
a waste of resources, referred to by economists as the “deadweight burden of 
monopoly”: some people’s desires will remain unsatisfied even though they could 
have been fulfilled at virtually no additional cost. This is but one of the things that are 
likely to go awry in the case of patent protection, as may be seen from the list of 
“vices” that is appended to the “virtues” of patents; [and a similar catalogue can be 






















Economic Virtues and Vices of Copyright Protection 
 
Analytical justification: Copyright protection addresses the problem of high     
fixed (first copy) cost and low marginal (added copy) cost. 
 
Virtues: 
♦  Incentives for creative productions 
♦  Reward for derivative innovation benefit s (‘droite de suivre’ principle 
rewards bias towards breadth/development potential) 




♦  ‘Deadweight’ burden of monopoly, heavy for ‘minority taste’ users 
♦  ‘Super-inefficiencies’ when applied to network goods (especially 
compatibility standards, interface standards) 
♦  Impediments to cumulative innovation, unless mitigated by ‘fair use’ 
exclusions 
 
♦  Inhibits development of modular system innovation (e.g., software system 
design)    - 9 -
Not surprisingly, then, the subject of intellectual property policies has proved 
troublesome for the economics profession, as it presents numerous situations in which 
the effort to limit unfair competition and provide adequate “market incentives” for 
innovation demonstrably results in a socially inefficient allocation of resources.  
From both the viewpoints of legal theory and economic analysis there is much to 
be said for interpreting patent and copyright institutions as a remarkably ingenious 
social contrivances, whereby protection of the discoverer’s or inventor’s exclusive 
right to commercially exploit new knowledge is exchanged for the disclosure of 
information that creates a public good; and, moreover, a public good that may be 
drawn upon to produce additional discoveries and inventions.
4 Nevertheless, it ought 
not to be supposed that the actual provisions of the laws affecting intellectual 
property rights fully honor this social bargain. True, no patent is valid that does not 
describe the invention in “clear, precise, and exact terms,” thereby disclosing 
sufficient information to enable second-comers to practice the invention without 
“undue experimentation.” American patent law is unusual in going farther than this, 
in requiring the patent applicants to disclose the best mode in which they contemplate 
implementing their invention. But, in practice these provisions often prove 
insufficient to overcome the effects of the economic incentives that patentees usually 
have to withhold some pertinent information, either for their private use or as a basis 
to extract additional rents for the transfer of know-how that is complementary to that 
disclosed by the patent. 
Delays in the release of information add to the academic research community’s 
concerns over the way that the workings of the patent system restrict access to new 
scientific and technological findings. U.S. patent law follows the principle that 
priority in invention, rather than being first to file a patent application is what 
matters; it therefore allows applicants a one-year grace period after publication. But 
most foreign systems award patents on a “first to file” basis, which means that even 
American researchers are induced – by their own or their supporting organization’s 
commercial goals – to delay publication of their findings and inventions until they 
have prepared patent applications to secure rights in other countries. During the two 
decades following the passage of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which authorized 
universities in the U.S. to seek patents on innovations arising from federally funded 
research projects, there has been more-or-less continuous modification of institutional 
rules in the direction of lengthening the permissible duration of delays placed on the 
publication of research findings for purposes of allowing the filing of patent 
applications.
5 
                                                 
4 For the legal and economic interpretations, respectively, see, e.g., EISENBERG [1989]; 
DASGUPTA AND DAVID [1987]; DASGUPTA AND DAVID [1994]; DAVID [1994].  
5 The effects of the Bayh-Dole legislation (U.S.C. §§200-211: 291-307) on university 
patenting are reviewed by MOWERY et al. [2001]; COHEN, FLORIDA AND GOE [1994] report 
widespread restraints by U.S. university-industry research centers on publication to permit 
the filing of patent applications. DAVID [1996] discusses these delays and related restrictions.     - 10 -
From the standpoint of academic researchers the greatest deficiency of the 
statutory disclosure requirements imposed by patent laws is simply that little 
scientific or technical data may be divulged in meeting this stipulation, so that the 
patent itself is of only limited interest and serves mainly as a notice that the patentees 
may be willing to supply more useful information, for some fee. Moreover, 
researchers’ ability to make use of such information as the patent does divulge is by 
no means assured until the end of its life; the patent not only excludes others from 
selling the invention, but also prohibits them from making and using it. That the use 
of an invention for purposes of research, and hence in generating further discoveries 
and innovations, ought not be proscribed has long been recognized by patent case law 
in the U.S: researchers have been allowed to defend themselves from infringement 
suits on grounds of “experimental use” – so long as the infringer is able to show that 
no commercial benefit was derived thereby. Given the case law precedents in the U.S. 
that reject this defense when the infringing researcher is found to have profited, the 
drive on the part of university administrators to exploit patent rights under the 
provisions of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act may thus be seen as contributing indirectly as 
well as directly to creating more formidable barriers to the ability of academic 
researchers to rapidly access new research tools and results.
6 
The same situation does not arise with conventional copyright protection, since 
what is being protected is the published form in which ideas have been expressed; 
only that which is fully disclosed can qualify the author for legal protection against 
infringers. Inasmuch as it is difficult, if not impossible to establish that unauthorized 
copies were made of a text that had not been made public in some way, authors 
seeking legal protection for their work have every incentive to hasten its disclosure. 
Moreover, in recognition of the cultural and scientific benefits of exegetical and 
critical writings, and further research based upon published information and data – 
not to mention the interests of authors in having such usage made on the basis of 
accurate representations of their work – statutory exceptions traditionally are 
provided to permit “fair use” infringements of copyrighted material. Largely for these 
reasons, this form of intellectual property protection historically has not raised serious 
objections on the grounds of impeding rapid access to new scientific or technological 
data and information. But, the situation has changed. 
 
 
                                                 
6 DAM [1999] points out that because the case law has tended to reject the “experimental use” 
defense against infringement suits whenever the researcher might profit, this exception to 
patent protection is less likely to prove beneficial for academic researchers in fields like 
biomedical sciences, where even publicly-funded “basic” research may yield short-term 
economic payoffs. The prescience of this observation is affirmed by the refusal of the 
Supreme Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
against the defendant in the case Madey v Duke (University):  307 F3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2002), cert.  d e n i e d  1 5 6  L .  E d  2
nd 656 (2003).  [See 
http://laws.findlaw.com/fed/011567.html.]   - 11 -
3   The Recent Renewed Push for Stronger, More Extensive IPR Protections 
 
The economic prominence of intellectual property, and concerns to strengthen the 
legal protections afforded patents, copyrights and trademarks, have been rising in 
recent years. In the U.S. over the past decade both patent applications and patent 
grants have increased at a rate of about 6 per cent per annum, compared to about one 
per cent per annum in the preceding forty years. The value of intellectual property is 
increasing as a share of average total firm value; the number of patent applications is 
growing at double-digit rates in the major patent offices; and licensing and cross-
licensing are being employed with greater frequency than ever, particularly so in 
high-technology industries. The greater intensity of innovation, characteristic of the 
knowledge-driven economy, and the increase in the propensity to patent (that is, the 
rise in the ratio number of patents/number of innovations or number of patents per 
real R&D spending), which indicates the emergence of new research and innovation 
management techniques, are proximate developments driving these quantitative 
trends (see e.g. KORTUM AND LERNER [1998]): 
There is a qualitative aspect to the growth of patenting as well. Patents are being 
registered on new types of objects such as software, genetic creations and devices for 
electronic trade over the Internet, and by new actors (universities, researchers in the 
public sector). This general trend is also reflected in the increase in exclusivity rights 
over instruments, research materials and databases. All this contributes to the 
unprecedented expansion of the knowledge market and the proliferation of exclusive 
rights on whole areas of intellectual creation. 
Numerous economic forces are driving these developments. First, patents have 
acquired increased importance among the intangible assets of new and/or small 
companies, and more broadly for many firms involved in innovation-based 
competition, because this is sometimes the only effective way to signal the 
enterprise’s value to potential investors. Second, patents have acquired greater 
strategic value in industries where previously they were acquired more-or-less as a 
by-product of the R&D process: extensive portfolios of legal rights have come to be 
valued as means of deterring other firms from entering a market niche, and as 
weapons to counter infringement suits filed by rivals. (see e.g. GRANSTRAND [1999]; 
HALL AND ZIEDONIS [2001]). Even for mid-size firms, however, the goal of building 
an effective “defensive” patent portfolio is likely to remain excessively costly, and so 
the new defensive environment has elicited the emergence of an alternative strategy: 
“defensive publishing.” By openly describing an invention, and so establishing it’s 
place in the “prior art,” the strategy of pre-emptive disclosure aims to preserve the 
option eventually to employ an invention free from the interference of anyone else 
who might come upon and manage to patent the same idea.
7  
                                                 
7 See MILSTEIN [2002]. This strategy would appear to be most effective in the cases of 
process inventions that are quite specific in nature, and have strong complementarities with 
the firm’s line of business.    - 12 -
The third set of “drivers” has been the policy changes taking place in the U.S. and 
Europe. Patenting policy as decided by the patent offices and courts deals with the 
interpretation of the three basic patentability criteria. They always played a role of 
regulation, blocking or slowing down private appropriation in certain fields. Since the 
1980’s pro-patenting attitudes at high levels of government have reflect themselves in 
the rules followed by patent offices: patentability criteria have gradually been eased 
and extended to new subject matter areas. The increasing ability of researchers to 
obtain patents on fundamental knowledge, research tools and databases is part and 
parcel of the broader movement towards strengthening IPRs whose implications for 
the conduct of scientific research have become increasingly problematic. 
Lastly, it is important to briefly notice the reinforcing effects of alterations in the 
behaviors of commercial firms, non-profit organizations and public institutions. 
Prominent under this heading are:   
(i) Major investment commitments to basic research by private firms in certain 
sectors (notably in the genomics area, where a new generation of firms has emerged 
with research specializations that bring them into direct rivalries with the 
fundamental research programs being carried on in universities and other public 
sector research establishments (PSRE’s) . 
(ii) Changes in the behavior of universities and public institutes have contributed 
significantly to increased patenting in the U.S., particularly in the biotechnology and 
medical devices fields; more generally universities have become more and more 
oriented towards exploiting the intellectual property system as a means of capturing 
revenue, and demonstrating a commitment to the promotion of economic 
development in their regions. (see HENDERSON, JAFFE AND TRAJTENBERG [1998]; 
MOWERY et al. [2001]). 
(iii) Privatization of some of the activities of governmental civilian agencies which 
become major players in the contractual research market. (see JAFFE  AND LERNER 
[1999]). 
These trends toward commodification of information do not necessarily lead to an 
excessive privatization of knowledge. In many cases the establishment of intellectual 
property rights strengthens private incentives, allows the commitment of substantial 
private resources, and thereby improves the conditions for the commercialization of 
inventions to benefit ultimate users. Moreover, the establishment of private rights 
does not totally prevent the diffusion of knowledge, even if it does limit it.  A large 
proportion of private knowledge is disseminated outside the market system, either 
within consortia or by means of networks of trading and sharing of knowledge, the 
foundation of the unintentional spillovers.  
Further, too much should not be made of the separation between the spheres in 
which information-goods are freely shared, and that in which access to them is tightly 
controlled by private profit-seeking agents. At least, it is important to notice that there 
is a region in which the two can overlap.  Indeed, business publishers actually may 
find it possible to enhance their profits by permitting and even facilitating free 
sharing of information goods among socially connected producer- and consumer-  - 13 -
groups – that is to say, among bounded entities (such as families, social clubs, and 
work-groups) in which membership is limited by conditions other than payment of 
fees, and within which there is considerably less heterogeneity of demands for the 
goods in question than that which exists in the population at large. 
Allowing free sharing in this sphere, in effect, permits self-aggregation of potential 
customers into collectivities whose joint “willingness to pay” will significantly excess 
the sum of the constituent members’ willingness to pay on for the good or service in 
question.
8 This point constitutes a general important qualification of the widely 
asserted claim that digitally assisted, low marginal cost reproduction encourages 
“piracy” (unlicensed copying and redistribution) which must be injurious to copyright 
holders, and consequently warrants introduction of stronger protections against all 
unauthorized copying. It is particularly appropriate in the context of the present 
discussion to point out that academic scientific research networks are in a sense 
paradigmatic of the self-selected producer groupings whose information goods 
requirements might be more profitably met by publisher/vendors who permitted, or 
actually facilitated free (intra-group) sharing. Moreover, in “the knowledge society” -
- where collaborative generation of new ideas and practices is expected to 
characterize a growing segment of business activity – the scientific research network 
conceived of as a form of “competence based club,” may become a paradigm for an 
economically much larger part of the market for information-goods that are research 
inputs. 
When viewed from that perspective, the current rush to tighten the copyright 
regime and encourage strict enforcement of “anti-piracy” provisions of all kinds, may 
at some date in the not-so-distant future come to be perceived as having been a 
serious mistake. Not only because its consequences may have been injurious to the 
conduct of open science, but because they were antithetical to the development and 
exploitation of new and more profitable business opportunities. Nevertheless, its 
evident that additional information about the distribution of potential customers for 
information goods is required to exploit the opportunities to profit by permitting free 
sharing, and that many vendors are content to avoid the costs of such strategies 
altogether, along with the possibilities that they could be abused. 
There are clear grounds for concern that virtually all of the recent trends contribute 
to a general shift towards enlargement of the domain of private property in 
information-goods, and the strengthening of protections for such rights. This reflects 
a sea-change in attitudes regarding the proper role of IPRs: traditionally, IPRs have 
been considered as one among a number of policy instruments that modern societies 
can use to elicit the disclosure of technological information, and to spur innovative 
efforts.  On this view, they co-exist with other incentive structures, each of which has 
its drawback as well as its peculiar advantages, so that there are system level 
complementarities to be gained when they are employed in proper balance with one 
                                                 
8 On the conditions under which publishers’ profits are raised by permitting free sharing 
of copyrighted material, see, e.g., LIEBOWITZ [1985], BESEN  [1986], BESEN AND KIRBY 
[1989] and BAKOS, BRYNJOLFSSON AND LICHTMAN [1999].    - 14 -
another.
9  The new view that has come to dominate recent policy discussions, 
however, is that IPRs are the only satisfactory instrument because they provide 
automatic commodification and “valorization” of the intangible capital represented 
by knowledge; they are therefore the common currency or ‘ruler’ for measuring the 
output of activities devoted to knowledge generation and the basis for markets in 
knowledge exchange.  
Leaving aside the matter of its analytical defects, the strength of support this 
policy stance has enjoyed in government circles is puzzling in light of the repeated 
survey findings which reveal that patents are not regarded by industrial firms as the 
most important means of appropriating the economic benefits of their innovations, or 




4   … and its Impacts on Open Science 
 
The restructuring of the legal regimes relating to patents and copyrights, and the 
adjustments of behavior to the new incentives created by those institutional 
innovations are likely to impact the organization and conduct of scientific research 
and publishing. Indeed, they seem bound to figure among the more prominent 
unexpected consequences of the very same digital infrastructure technologies that 
were created by publicly sponsored scientists and engineers. Unfortunately, at least 
some of these repercussions now appear to be detrimental to the long-term vitality of 
the practice of “open” science in the world’s academic research communities. Such 
an untoward effect will not follow from the technology itself. It comes, instead, from 
the lack of appropriate concern for maintaining a healthy balance between the domain 
of publicly supported knowledge production and exchanges, and the sphere in which 
flourish private, proprietary R&D and profitable businesses based upon information 
goods. 
One source of difficulty in preserving such balance is quite immediately apparent. 
An attractive short-run strategy of business development entails utilizing enhanced 
information processing and telecommunications in conjunction with the assertion of 
private property rights over the mass of publicly provided data and information 
products. Rather than having to produce wholly new content for distribution via the 
new and more effective technical facilities, an obvious first line of enterprise is to 
make use of what comes freely and most readily to hand. Ever since the introduction 
of printing with moveable type, the history of new publication and broadcast media 
has shown how automatic it is for entrepreneurs to seek first to draw upon content 
that was already available in the public domain. 
Hence, one can expect that this approach will continue to be tried, exploiting 
larger and larger portions of the body of codified scientific knowledge and 
observational data that has been built up under public patronage and maintained as a 
                                                 
9 This formulation is presented in DAVID [1993]; DASGUPTA AND DAVID [1994].  
10 See, LEVIN, et al. [1987]; ARUNDEL [2000]; COWAN AND HARRISON [2000].   - 15 -
common, readily accessible research resource. Sometimes the commercialization of 
public databases makes good economic sense: because private firms may have 
technical or marketing capabilities that would add value for a variety of end users of 
publicly generated data, whereas existing government agencies or NGOs lack that 
competence. Such was shown to be the case in regard to the distribution and 
packaging by commercial weather information services of data gathered by the U.S. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
11  
But, the possibility of seriously adverse consequences elsewhere in the national 
research system, from ill-designed policies and programs to promote proprietary 
exploitation of public knowledge resources, also needs to be recognized. Consider 
what ensued in those circumstances from the Reagan Administration's sponsorship of 
the Land-Remote Sensing Commercialization Act (1984), under which the 
responsibility for the operations of the Landsat system of remote sensing satellites 
was transferred from NOAA management, and a monopoly on Landsat images was 
awarded in 1985 to the Earth Observation Satellite (EOSAT) Company, a joint 
venture of Hughes and RCA. The price of Landsat images immediately rose 10-fold, 
from $400 per image to $4000. This permitted EOSAT to attract profitable business 
from commercial customers and the federal government, although virtually none 
from academic and independent researchers. Indeed, the impact of the privatization of 
Landsat operations upon basic research being conducted by university groups around 
the world was quite devastating, as they suddenly went from being “data rich” into a 
condition not of actual “data poverty” so much as one of data “non-entitlement.”
12  
The EOSAT Co. secured its monopoly position in the market for satellite images 
by virtue of being given physical control over the source of (Landsat) images. Yet it 
is equally possible to imagine that a similarly damaging outcome for academic 
researchers would follow from the exercise of the market power that a commercial 
provider of a scientific database might gain under intellectual property protection; 
especially under a legal regime that granted indefinitely renewable copyright 
protection to the database contents, whether or not the data was otherwise 
copyrightable.
13 
The recent extension of copyright to software has itself permitted a breach of the 
disclosure principle that parallels the one already noted in regard to patents. Under 
American copyright law (in order to qualify to pursue infringers for damages) it is 
sufficient to register only some sample extracts of a computer program’s “text,” 
rather than the entire body of code. Moreover, there is no requirement whatsoever to 
disclose the underlying “source code”; copyright protection can be obtained on the 
                                                 
11 See National Research Council [1997, pp. 116-124], for material underlying this and the 
following discussion.  
12 The term “non-entitlement” here alludes to Amartya Sen’s observation that people 
starved in India in 1918 not because the harvest was inadequate to feed them, but because the 
rise in grain prices deprived them of “entitlements” to the food that actually was available. 
13  Such also may be the import of the European Commission’s Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Databases, issued on March 11 1996, discussed below.   - 16 -
basis of a disclosure of just the machine language instructions, which, even were they 
to be divulged in their entirety would be difficult and costly to interpret and re-utilize 
without access to the source code. While this practice surely can be seen to violate the 
principle that no burden of “undue experimentation” should be placed upon second 
comers, the latter requirement is one that holds only in the case of patent law. It never 
was contemplated that one might be able to register a text for full copyright 
protection without practically disclosing its contents to interested readers. 
A further, more generally disconcerting set of developments may prove quite 
destructive to the effectiveness of traditional safeguards against “fair use” exemptions 
for research (and educational) purposes – even where such provisions continue to be 
made. This threat has emerged only recently in the form of digital technologies that 
limit “on line” copying of electronic information. Advanced encryption systems now 
underpin many computing and communications security services, and permit a wide 
variety of security objectives to be achieved by establishing discretionary control 
over access to encrypted data, along with assurance for both users and service 
provider of message authentication and data integrity, as well as privacy and 
confidentiality goals. There are other techniques for marking and monitoring the use 
of distributed digital information, such as “water marking,” which attaches a signal to 
digital data that can be detected or extracted later to make documentable assertions 
about its provenance, authenticity, or ownership; “fingerprinting” embeds a mark in 
each copy that uniquely identifies the authorized recipient. 
“Self help” or “copyright management” systems that make use of encryption or 
prevent unauthorized copying of “clear text” allow copyright holders to enforce their 
legal claim to capture economic value from users of the protected material, and, 
moreover enable selective access to elements of content that makes it more feasible 
for the vendor to engage in price discrimination. Marking and monitoring techniques, 
in contrast, do not allow direct enforcement of copyrights, but can be used to deter 
unauthorized copying and distribution of information by facilitating tracking of errant 
data to the original recipients who were responsible for its improper use. 
These advances in digital technology have a direct economic effect that is 
efficiency enhancing, insofar as they reduce the costs of enforcing a statutory 
property right and thereby securing whatever societal benefits copyright legislation is 
designed to promote. Yet, in the currently prevailing enthusiasm for stronger 
intellectual property protection, the American drafters of the 1998 Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act included a provision that prohibits the circumvention of “any 
technological measure that effectively controls access” to a copyrighted work, and 
outlawed the manufacture, importation or public distribution of any technology 
primarily produced for the purpose of such circumvention.
14 The problem posed by 
this statutory reinforcement for applications of novel self-help technologies is simply 
that it may render impossible the exercise of “fair use” of copyrighted material by 
                                                 
14 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), United States Code, 17, §1201; also, 
DAM [1998].   - 17 -
researchers and educators, leaving the provision of information access for such 
purposes as a matter for the discretion of copyright holders.  
This, however, is not the only serious assault upon the traditional means of 
permitting publicly supported open science communities to pursue their work 
untrammeled by the protections afforded to copyright owners. As attractive as the 
prospect of more powerful “self help” technologies may appear to be in curtailing 
“digital piracy,” such remedies would create a threat to the achievement of a 
reasonably regime for the allocation of scientific and technological information goods 
while providing protection for private investments in information goods. One way in 
which it is feasible to approximate the efficient workings of a system of 
discriminatory pricing for data and information is to allow educators, scholars and 
researchers to invoke “fair use” exemptions from the requirements for licensing 
material that is copyrighted or otherwise legally protected by statute. In effect, this 
approach would set differentially lower prices for the use of information goods in 
producing and distributing knowledge – indeed, prices that approximate the 
negligibly small marginal costs of digital reproduction and transmission. 
But, so far we have considered only the most straightforward and obvious of the 
potentially adverse consequences of turning over parts of the public knowledge 
domain to information monopolists. The staking out of property rights to scientific 
knowledge has potentially serious and subtler implications for the circulation of 
information and its use in research. These may be grouped, for the sake of 
convenience, under the general heading of “transaction costs increases.” Firstly, it is 
possible that IPR-related transaction costs may increase so much that the result can be 
the blockage of knowledge exploitation and accumulation. Attention has lately come 
to focus on the potential “tragedy of the anti-commons” in biotechnology, which 
envisages a state of affairs in which the knowledge domain has been so minutely sub-
divided by property claims (on what are essentially complementary pieces of 
information) that the costs of assembling the constituent “properties” needed to 
engage in further research will pose a crushing burden upon further technological 
advance.
15 
The language here is perhaps rather overdrawn; rather than the “destruction the 
commons by overgrazing” (something that actually was rare in the history of 
Europe’s agrarian communes), a more informative metaphor is that of the erection of 
so many toll stations along the research paths that only journeys promising the 
highest, and most certain economic payoffs would be undertaken. The point brought 
out by the latter formulation is that one should not expect to find evidence of a 
blockage of R&D projects in general, or frequent cases of breakdowns of negotiations 
                                                 
15 In regard to the argument regarding the perverse influence of IPR upon innovation, 
much interest recently has been stirred by the “anti-commons” formulation in HELLER AND 
EISENBERG [1998]. The general point, however, has been in circulation among economists 
and IPR lawyers for some time: see, for example, MERGES AND NELSON [1994]; DAVID AND 
FORAY [1995].   - 18 -
when projects are well underway.
16 Anticipations of numerous costly negotiations to 
secure critical licenses would have the effect of discouraging attempts to pursue 
certain classes of projects, particularly the higher risk, exploratory lines of research 
that combine the use of protected research tools or assemble protected technological 
sub-components in to more complex systems.
17  
Secondly, efforts and costs devoted to sorting out conflicting and overlapping 
claims to IPR will increase, as will uncertainty about the nature and extent of legal 
liability in using knowledge inputs. Again policy makers and academics are 
concerned with the increase of litigation costs, including indirect costs, which may 
distort the innovative behavior of small companies. As put well by John Barton, there 
is a problem when the number of intellectual property lawyers is growing faster than 
the amount of research.
18 That is what has been happening in the U.S., and there are 





5   Property Rights in Scientific Databases: A “Digital Technology Boomerang” 
 
A new and quite unexpected direct threat to the academic research enterprise in 
science and engineering has emerged since the mid-1990's, as a result of the 
extension of sui generis copyright protection to databases, even to databases 
containing non-copyrightable material. This institutional innovation emerged first in 
the European Union Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases (issued March 
11,1996), which directed member states to create a new broadly comprehensive type 
of intellectual property that was free from a number of the important and long-
standing limitations and exceptions traditionally provided by copyright law in order 
to safeguard access to information used in socially beneficial, knowledge-creating 
activities such as research and teaching. The EU Database Directive applies equally 
to non-electronic and electronic databases, even though, as will be seen, it originated 
as a strategic “industrial policy” response to the commercial development of on-line 
(electronic) databases in America. 
Further, as a device to secure international acceptance of the new approach 
initiated by this directive (which remains binding upon the member states of the 
European Union, in the sense of requiring implementation in each of their national 
statutes) reciprocity provisions were included. The latter in effect threatened the 
commercial creators of databases who were nationals of foreign states outside the EU 
                                                 
16 Historical cases of bargaining breakdown, and refusals to license key patents are 
documented by MERGES [1994]. 
17 This is the essence of the more nuanced view developed in EISENBERG, [2001]. 
  
18  Professor Barton (Stanford University Law School) made this remark in his 
introduction to a seminar presentation to the Science, Technology and Economic Policy 
Workshop at Stanford University, in Fall Quarter, 2000.    - 19 -
with retaliatory infringement of copyright material in their products, unless their 
respective governments became signatories to a World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) draft convention on databases that had been framed to embody 
the essential provisions of the sui generis copyright protection established under the 
1996 EU Directive.
19 In this regard, as well as in others, the EU Directive called for a 
departure from the principle of administering commercial laws on a “national 
treatment” basis, under which a country’s domestic laws (whether for intellectual 
property production, or unfair business practices) should treat foreign nationals like 
the country’s citizens. The principle of national treatment is embodied in Article 3 of 
the TRIPs Agreement, as well as more generally in the Paris Convention (on patents 
and trademark protection) and the Berne Convention (on copyright protection).
20 
The European Commission’s strategy succeeded in setting in motion an 
Administration-initiated legislative response in the U.S. Congress, which has now led 
to two competing draft statutes being actively debated. The response began in May 
1996 with the introduction at the behest of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office of 
House of Representatives of a bill, H.R. 3531, short-titled the “Database Investment 
and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996.” This first and ill-considered rush 
to legislate soon encountered opposition from the U.S. academic research community 
and non-commercial publishers of scientific information. But although that attempt 
proved unavailing, the legislative genie has been let out of the bottle, with the result 
that the 104
th Congress presently has before it two further pieces of proposed 
legislation. The first of these is “The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act,” 
H.R. 345, which was introduced in January 1999 and represents a re-incarnation of 
the quite pernicious approach taken in the original Administration-inspired legislative 
proposal in 1996. A second bill, “The Consumer and Investors Access to Information 
Act,” H.R. 1858, was introduced in May 1999, and contains provisions protecting 
access to database information that are rather more responsive to the objections raised 
during 1997 against H.R. 3531. This too failed to gain support in the Senate. Its 
proponents promised to try again, and in October 2003 a new bill (H.R. 3261), “The 
Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act” was referred to the 
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee,  which is expected to vote to send to 
forward for passage by the Congress.
21 
                                                 
19 The 1996 draft was entitled: “Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases...”, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC, Geneva, 
August 30.  
20 Objections to this departure were recorded in the testimony of the General Counsel of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce (Andrew J. Pincus), in the 106
 th Congress House 
Hearings on H.R. 1858 (1999): section F. 
21 While not simply a reincarnation of H.R. 1858, H.R. 3261 contains only limited “fair use” 
exclusions for “educational purposes” of a non-commercial nature, which, as its critics point out, could 
be over-ridden by the terms of “click-wrap” licenses.  See: 
http://www.library.yale.edu/~License/ListArchives/0310/msg00033.htm.   - 20 -
A rapid review of the main features of the EC’s Database Directive of 1996 
highlights the following problematic points:
22  
First, the Directive’s sui generis approach departs from the long established 
principles of intellectual property law by removing the distinction between protection 
of expression and protection of ideas, a distinction that is central in US copyright law 
and was embodied in the TRIPS agreement adopted by the WTO. 
Second, compilers of databases in the EU will now be able to assert ownership and 
demand payment for licensing the use of content, which already is in the public 
domain, including material that could not be otherwise copyright-protected.  
Third, the language of the Directive discards a second distinction fundamental in 
copyright law, that between original expressive matter and pre-existing expressive 
matter,  because the Directive fails to attach any legal significance to the difference 
between expressive matter that already exists in the public domain, and matter that is 
original and newly disclosed. Domestic laws and national courts that have reaffirmed 
this omission, in effect have allowed a database maker to qualify for renewal of the 
15-year term of exclusive rights over the database as a whole – by virtue of having 
made a “significant investment” in updates, additions, revisions.
23 Under U.S 
copyright, however, only the additions and revisions themselves which would be 
considered as “derivative work” from the prior original expressive matter would be 
entitled to fresh legal protection. 
Fouth, strict limitations upon re-use of database contents are imposed by the 
Directive, requiring third party regeneration or payment for licenses to extract such 
material. This inhibits integration and recombination of existing scientific database 
contents with new material to provide more useful, specialized research resources. 
The joint implications of these provisions are worrisome in what they permit. 
Regardless of whether or not it is possible in theory to regenerate the raw contents of 
a database from publicly available sources, under the terms of the Directive investors 
in database production can always deny third parties the right to use pre-existing data 
in value-added applications, even when the third parties are willing to pay royalties 
on licenses for such use. An initial database producer simply can block subsequent 
creation of new, special-purpose databases which reproduced parts of existing 
compilations, wherever the regeneration of such data de novo was infeasible or 
terribly costly. Consider, for example, the case of years of remote-sensing satellite 
observations, or data-tracks from high energy particle collision detectors, or multi-
year bibliographic compilations of scientific publications and citations thereto, all of 
                                                 
22 The following draws upon the documented legal analysis in National Research Council 
(1997), pp. 148-153. 
23 See EC Directive on Databases, note 52, articles 7(1), providing an initial 15-year term 
from the date of completion; 7(2) extending protection for an additional 15 years if the 
database “is made available to the public in whatever manner” before the initial term expires; 
7(3) allowing 15-year renewals for “[a]ny substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively, to the contents of a database…from the accumulation of successive additions, 
deletions or alterations, which …result in …a substantial new investment.”     - 21 -
which are scientific “research tools” representing a cumulative legacy of past 
collaborative efforts, ready access to which may now become privately owned.  
Where a database maker also held the exclusive rights to license previously 
copyright-protected publications, it would be entirely proper under the terms of the 
Directive to refuse third parties licenses in that material, while incorporating it within 
a database protected under the terms of the EC Directive. By excluding conditions for 
compulsory licensing, as well as omitting to provide remedies for abuse of the legal 
protections newly accorded to database investors, the Directive opens the door for the 
construction of indefinitely renewable monopolies in both non-re-generatable and 
non-re-generatable scientific data. 
The Directive abandons the principle of “fair use” for research, as distinct from 
extraction and use of data for purposes of “illustration in teaching or research.” How 
“illustrative use” is to be interpreted remains ill defined, pending some infringement 
litigation that would provide opportunity for a court ruling in the matter. But the 
current consensus among IPR scholars is that “illustration” falls far short of the 
normal scope of research use of copyrighted material.  
The absence of fair use exclusions for research (and research training) creates the 
prospect of a two-way squeeze on public sector funded research programs, as the 
costs of obtaining commercially supplied data are likely to rise. The 10-fold rise in 
the unit prices of remote-sensing satellite images that immediately followed the 
privatization of LANSAT satellite operations in 1985, and its withering effects upon 
university-based research projects, should be recalled in this connection.
24 Continuing 
pressures for cuts in government budgets, taken in combination with the priority that 
tends to be accorded to near-term applications-oriented research vis-à-vis exploratory 
science, is likely to encourage derogation to commercial database generators of the 
function of compiling, updating and publishing databases that were created by, and 
remain of continuing relevance for basic public sector research. There is a two-fold 
risk in this situation: one is the threat to data quality in the separating of the database 
creation and maintenance from the scientific expertise of the research community that 
creates and uses the data; the other is the resulting squeeze on public research 
resources, as already restrictive appropriations would have to be spent on purchasing 
data and database licenses. 
When considering the benefits to society of enabling the appropriation of the value 
of this facility (and ones like it in other research fields) for users who seek to exploit 
it in conducting commercially oriented research – say, in developing new genetic 
diagnostic kits, or new drug therapies – the question to be asked is what effect doing 
so will have on the probability of valuable discoveries both in the near term and over 
the longer run. Seeking to apply the rights granted by the EC’s Database Directive, 
and to partition and restructure the “information space” so as to readily extract 
licensing fees from users, would have the predictable effect of curtailing searches that 
were not thought to have a high expectation of quickly finding something with high 
                                                 
24 See the discussion in Section 4, above.   - 22 -
“applications value.” In other words, the probabilities of unexpected discoveries 
would be further reduced by the economically restricted utilization of the facility.  
Targeted searches may be quite affordable, but wholesale extraction of the data-
spaces’ contents to permit exploratory search activities is especially likely to be 
curtailed. 
The adverse influences of the consequent “lost discoveries” also are likely to 
ripple outwards. This is so because the development of new and more powerful 
search devices, and techniques of pattern recognition, statistical analysis, and so 
forth, are more likely to figure among the discoveries that would be made collectively 
through the exploratory use of the facility by a larger number of searchers. Therefore, 
some cost of extracting economic rents from this construct today will most likely 
come in the form of smaller benefits (and the sacrifice of reduced applications-
oriented research costs) in the future. In addition, one should consider the possibly 
serious inhibiting effect of setting up a “model” of IPR exploitation of such structures 
upon the construction of some new, presently unimagined information tools that 
would require the assembly (and licensing) of myriad information components from 
many, diverse sources.  
A concrete illustration of the creative power of collaborations built to exploit 
enhanced digital technologies is provided by the vast, multi-dimensional “information 
space” that has been built up over the course of many years by the research 
community whose activities are coordinated today by the European Bioinformatics 
Institute (EBI). This “virtual library” is a dynamic collective research tool rather than 
a simple repository of information. The ordinary conceptualization of “a database” is 
too static, and, in a sense too pre-structured, to comprehend the potential for 
discoveries that has been created by this collective construct. Yet, as Graham 
Cameron, the EBI’s Director, recently pointed out to an EC Committee [European 
Commission 2001: Appendix 1], this information space began to be formed, 
fortunately,  long before the research communities involved gave any consideration to 
intellectual property right restrictions on the use of the information contents that were 
being linked for subsequent retrieval and analysis. The implication was clear that it 
would be far more difficult in today’s environment to create this particular research 
tool. 
 
6   Using IPR to Make “Good Neighbors” in Science: Some Modest Proposals 
 
What sort of intellectual property arrangements will make for “good fences” in the 
“information spaces” where collaborative research enterprises are most likely to 
thrive? My conclusion is that such institutional innovations such as the EU Database 
Directive, and the US MDCA provision of legal reinforcements for the application by 
IPR-owners of digital “self help” technologies .exemplify the wrong direction in 
which to be moving. In the domain of scientific and technological information, the 
“best fences” are likely to be “low and penetrable.”    - 23 -
IPR regimes when implemented in that manner can serve a socially valuable 
informational purpose, by helping potential collaboration members locate and access 
various sources of scientific and technological knowledge, and it would be desirable 
to improve the patent and copyright registration systems towards that end. There are 
some well known circumstances where significant patent protection is warranted by 
the high fixed costs that public regulatory policies impose upon the private 
developers of innovative commodities that are readily “reverse engineered” and 
cheaply copied – e.g., the extensive field testing requirements for pharmaceutical 
products and medical devices. But, these represent the exception rather than the rule, 
and the end products themselves typically do not have the essential ‘public goods’ 
properties associated with information-good and information-tools.  
Thus, the important broad principle to be established is a simple one: whatever are 
the legal rights that societies construct regarding “intellectual property,” whether 
under international patent and copyright regimes or by sui generis protections 
(inadvisable as these may be, on other grounds), the licensing terms available to 
“owners” never should be allowed to create inefficient artificial impediments to the 
intensive utilization of the contents of virtual archives and information tools.  
In the view of most economists, the “first best” allocation system in situations 
where goods are produced with high fixed costs but far lower marginal costs, is to 
apply what is known as the “Ramsey pricing” rule. This fits the case of information 
products such as scientific publication and data, where the first-copy costs are very 
great in relationship to the negligible unit costs of copies. Ramsey pricing in essence 
amounts to price discrimination between users whose demands are inelastic and those 
users for whom the quantity purchased is extremely price-sensitive. The former class 
of buyers therefore will bear high prices without curtailing the quantity purchased of 
the goods in question, and hence not suffer great reductions in consumption utility on 
that account, whereas the low prices offered to those in the second category will spare 
them the burden of economic welfare reducing cutbacks in their use of the good.  
The case might then be made for treating scholars and public sector, university-
based researchers as having highly elastic information and data demands. Such a 
characterization would follow from considering that this category of knowledge-
workers is employed on projects that have fixed budget allocations from public (or 
non-profit) entities, organizations that are expected to promote the interests of society 
at large. Since there is strong complementary between their data and information 
requirements, on the one hand, and on the other resources they use in their research, 
the effects of raising the real price of this input are tantamount to sharply reducing the 
quantity of useful work that such projects can accomplish so long as their budgets 
remain fixed. Obviously, there is no workable economic or political mechanism that 
would serve to “index” the nominal value of public research budgets on the prices of 
commercially provided data. Even were such mechanisms to be found, commitment 
to implement them on the part of the rich societies would most likely result in pricing 
the use of scientific information and data beyond the reach of many poorer societies.   - 24 -
The general thrust of the policy advocated here is thus quite simple: statutes that 
would establish legal ownership rights for compilers of scientific and technological 
databases also should include provisions mandating compulsory licensing of 
scientific database contents at marginal costs (of data extraction and distribution) to 
accredited individuals and research institutions. The implication is that the fixed costs 
should be covered by lump sum subscription charges, which would be waived in the 
case of researchers engaged in constructing and maintaining these databases under 
the auspices of publicly supported projects. 
Those provisions could well be extended to all the users of such data and 
information resources who agreed to distribute the data they generated on the same 
basis as that on which they had been able to access the data and information used in 
creating it. That generalization of the so-called “Copyleft” principle, found in the 
GNU General Public License, would not have to be achieved through the licensing 
terms of copyrights—which would be a significant limitation of its scope in the 
context of scientific data. It could be implemented by the administrative action of 
public agencies that funded science and engineering research, and equally by the 
policies of private foundations with similar public goods-creating missions. The 
terms of the restrictions thus placed upon researchers receiving public (and quasi-
public) patronage might well seek to mimic the so-called “viral” features of the GNU 
GPL in their application to industry-university collaborative research programs: 
neither the cooperating firms nor the PSERs should be able to block others from 
using the (published) findings of publicly funded research by combining them with 
results that were obtained with the support of privately funding.  Of course, 
commercial ventures should not be restrained from obtaining intellectual property 
rights in the distinct information obtained by their R&D expenditures, nor from 
marketing ancillary and complementary goods and services. This would preserve at 
least some means of recouping the fixed costs of their contribution to the public 
“information infrastructures” that they undertook to create through cooperative R&D 
efforts with PSER researchers. 
Venturing a bit farther afield, to address the problems surrounding the increasing 
trend towards patenting of research tools, would be quite consistent with the spirit of 
the foregoing modest proposals. The second-best reform measure in this case would 
be to institute a public policy of “patent buy-outs,” under which public tax revenues 
would be used to purchase the rights to this class of inventions and place them in the 
public domain. Of course, some mechanisms probably would be sought to prevent 
public authorities from confiscating valuable patents at arbitrarily low compensation, 
or awarding inappropriately high “prizes” in the form of compensation to certain 
(favored) patentees. This complication calls for a somewhat more complicated bit of 
institutional machinery: inventions falling into the class of “research tools” would be 
made legally subject to compulsory licensing at a “reasonable” royalty rate, and the 
(regulated) rights to the revenue stream would then be publicly auctioned.  The public 
agency would stand ready to acquire the rights for the public domain by default, if the   - 25 -
“reservation” price pre-announced by the patent-holder was not reached in the private 
bidding. 
None of the foregoing proposals directly address the troubling possibility that one 
day soon either the U.S., or the E.U., or both jurisdictions may have statutes 
providing for both legal protection of database rights –such as now exist under the 
EU Directive, and criminal law sanctions reinforcing IP owners’ reliance upon 
technological “self-help” –such as now exist under the U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  Non-copyrightable and out-of-copyright material then could be 
locked up indefinitely in encrypted databases. What to do about the jeopardy into 
which that seemingly incremental, evolutionary step would place the future of the 
entire regime of limited legal protections for intellectual property, is a problem that 
lies beyond the scope of this paper. Conceivably, a concerted campaign to mitigate 
the already existing threats to “open science” could contribute to public awareness of 
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